• CrinterScaked@sh.itjust.works
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    1 year ago

    There is no way a user can know the website is real the first time it’s visited, without it presenting a verifiable certificate. It would be disastrous to trust the site after the first time you connected. Users shouldn’t need to care about security to get the benefits of it. It should just be seamless.

    There are proposals out there to do away with the CAs (Decentralized PKI), but they require adoption by Web clients. Meanwhile, the Web clients (chrome) are often owned by the same companies that own the Certificate Authorities, so there’s no real incentive for them to build and adopt technology that would kill their $100+ million CA industry.

    • PowerCrazy@lemmy.ml
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      1 year ago

      There is no way a user can know that their traffic hasn’t been man-in-the-middled by a compromised CA either. And why is it “disastrous” to trust a website after you have cryptographically verified its the same website you visited before? It would present the same public/private key pair that you already trust.

        • PowerCrazy@lemmy.ml
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          1 year ago

          That’s where the SSH analogy comes from. On the initial connection you get the signature of the web-site you are trying to visit and your browser trusts it from then on. If something changes later, then the scary warning comes up.

          • ToxicWaste@lemm.ee
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            1 year ago

            I hope for you, that you don’t SSH into any random machine and just import their cert.

            Usually you know the machines you are trying to connect to. That gives you the ability to add their cert to your trusted hosts before connecting the first time. So for browsing the WWW this makes not much sense, since you connect to way too many unknown hosts. It would create a ‘red is green’ mentality where users just import any unknown cert.

            The only similarity i see, which makes sense, would be e-banking and such. The bank could send you their certificate with the login credentials by post.

            • PowerCrazy@lemmy.ml
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              1 year ago

              Why? There is absolutely zero risk in SSHing into “random” machines especially since I’m using public ssh-keys. Of course the first time I connect to a machine it’s going to be untrusted, but who cares? I’m using SSH to ensure others can’t sniff my traffic.

              • ToxicWaste@lemm.ee
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                1 year ago

                If i want to sniff your traffic, ill set up another machine as MITM attack.

                I guess as long as you stay inside a secure company network, it wouldn’t be that bad. But if you go through the WWW, my advice is to manually add trusted hosts.

                • PowerCrazy@lemmy.ml
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                  1 year ago

                  Setting up a mitm on the internet is a non-trivial task and I’m quite confident you have neither the access, nor the ability to do that. Very few people do. So let’s just say that isn’t an attack vector that anyone should be concerned with.

                  • ToxicWaste@lemm.ee
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                    1 year ago

                    Everyone who can read your unencrypted traffic has the possibility to intercept your encrypted stuff. So it is really not that hard.

                    But you don’t seem to be bothered too much about that possibility. So lets agree to disagree.

      • UnculturedSwine@lemmy.world
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        1 year ago

        No one can remove all risk but the security threshold between intercepting an initial connection and compromising a CA are vastly different. The latter would be much more difficult to pull off which is why we use them. Sounds like this EU rule is going to put a ceiling on that though.

      • topperharlie@lemmy.world
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        1 year ago

        making sure a small part is very secure vs having to verify every domain I visit? yeah, let me keep using the current system… are you aware of the amount of domains you connect to every day?

        Also, I might be wrong, but if I remember correctly browsers/OS-es tend to come with a list of trusted certificate keys already, which makes adding compromised keys to that list not as easy as you suggest. (I don’t even know if that happens or if they just update as part of security updates of OS/browsers)